In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
The overarching goal of algorithmic mechanism design is to design computationally efficient algorithms that solve or approximate fundamental resource allocation problems in which the underlying data is a priori unknown to the algorithm. A problem that has received much attention in this context -albeit mostly in the form of negative results -is Combinatorial Public Projects (CPP). Here, there are m projects being considered by a public planner, n players, and a bound k ≤ m on the number of projects that may be chosen. Each player i has a private valuation vi(S) for each subset S of the projects. We consider the flexible variant of CPP, where a feasible solution is a set of at most k projects 1 . The goal is to choose a feasible set of projects S maximizing social welfare:
i vi(S). The valuations are initially unknown to the public planner, and must be elicited from the (self-interested) players. A "mechanism" for CPP extracts this information, and decides on a set of projects to undertake. The mechanisms we consider can charge the players payments in order to incentivize truthful reporting of their valuations. Moreover, we seek mechanisms that run in polynomial time.
Since CPP is highly inapproximable for general valuations -even by non-truthful algorithms -it is most interesting to study CPP for restricted classes of valuations. Most notable among these are submodular valuations, as they naturally model the pervasive notion of "diminishing marginal returns". In this paper, we study CPP for a fundamental and large subset of submodular valuations: Matroid Rank Sum Valuations. This class includes most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context. Most notably, it includes the canonical and arguably most natural example of submodularity: coverage functions.
Combinatorial public projects and its variants are examples of welfare maximization problems. There are many other examples, most notable among them are combinatorial auctions, with their many variants (see e.g. [25] ). Welfare maximization problems occupy a central position in mechanism design, not only because of the fundamental nature of the utilitarian objective, but also due to the rich economic theory surrounding them. Most notably, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see e.g. [25] ) is a general solution for all these problems, at least from an economic perspective. The VCG mechanism is truthful, in that it is in a player's best interest to report his true valuations regardless of the reports of the other players. Moreover, VCG finds the welfare maximizing solution.
Unfortunately, however, most interesting welfare maximization problems, such as combinatorial public projects, are NP-hard. Therefore, implementing VCG efficientlyi.e. in polynomial time -is impossible unless P = NP . Moreover, as first argued in [24] , most existing approximation algorithms -unlike exact algorithms -cannot be converted to truthful mechanisms by the imposition of a suitable payment scheme. This necessitates the design of carefully crafted approximation algorithms, tailored specifically for truthfulness. Understanding the power of these truthful approximation mechanisms is the central goal of algorithmic mechanism design. This research agenda was first advocated by Nisan and Ronen [23] . Since then, combinatorial auctions and combinatorial public projects have emerged as the paradigmatic "challenge-problems" of the field, with much work in recent years establishing upper and lower-bounds on truthful polynomial-time mechanisms for these problems, for example: [20, 11, 13, 12, 10, 6, 14, 27, 3, 4, 7, 17] .
The "holy grail" of algorithmic mechanism design is to design polynomial-time truthful approximation mechanisms that match the approximation guarantee of the best (nontruthful) polynomial-time approximation algorithm. Unfortunately, several recent impossibility results have shed serious doubt on the possibility of this goal [10, 27, 3, 4, 7] . Combinatorial public projects, in particular, bore the brunt of the most brutal of these negative results [27, 4, 7] . Fortunately, all but one of these lower bounds apply exclusively to deterministic mechanisms, and none apply to randomized mechanisms for the -arguably more natural -flexible variant of combinatorial public projects.
As the limitations of deterministic mechanisms became apparent, a recent research direction has focused on designing randomized approximation mechanisms for the fundamental problems of algorithmic mechanism design [20, 8, 15, 9, 17] . These mechanisms are instances of the only general approach 2 known for designing (randomized) truthful mechanisms: via maximal-in-distributional range (MIDR) algorithms [8] . An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions -the distributional range -independently of the valuations reported by the self-interested participants, and outputs a random sample from the distribution that maximizes expected (reported) welfare. The "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)" payment scheme renders an MIDR algorithm truthful in expectation -that is, a player unaware of the coin flips of the mechanism maximizes his expected utility by reporting truthfully.
Recently Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [17] presented the most general framework to date for the design of maximalin-distributional-range algorithms. Their approach is based on convex optimization, and generalizes the celebrated linearprogramming based approach of Lavi and Swamy [20] . Given a mathematical relaxation to a welfare maximization prob- 2 The random sampling approach used in [6] , while arguably general, does not seem applicable beyond auction settings -in particular, it is not applicable to combinatorial public projects. lem, [17] advocates designing randomized rounding schemes that are convex. Given a convex rounding scheme, the problem of finding the best output of the rounding scheme is a convex optimization problem solvable in polynomial time, and implements an MIDR allocation rule. They then show how to design a convex rounding scheme for combinatorial auctions with matroid rank sum valuations, yielding an optimal (1 − 1/e) approximation mechanism. We elaborate on the framework of [17] in Section 2.5.
By reducing the problem of designing a truthful mechanism to that of designing a convex rounding scheme, the approach of [17] yielded the first optimal truthful mechanism for a variant of combinatorial auctions with restricted valuations. It is now natural to wonder if their approach is applicable to other welfare maximization problems. In particular, can the convex rounding framework be used to obtain optimal approximation mechanisms for interesting variants of Combinatorial Public Projects?
We answer this question in the affirmative, and elaborate on our contributions below.
Contributions
We design a (1−1/e)-approximate convex rounding scheme for combinatorial public projects with matroid rank sum valuations. This yields a (1 − 1/e)-approximate truthful-inexpectation mechanism for CPP, running in expected polynomial time. This is the best approximation possible for this problem, even without truthfulness, unless P = NP . Therefore, ours is the first truthful mechanism for an NPhard variant of CPP that matches the approximation ratio of the best non-truthful algorithm. Our results works with "black-box" valuations, provided that players can answer a randomized analogue of value oracles.
To prove our results, we follow the general outline of [17] . However, our task is more challenging: whereas in combinatorial auctions, randomized rounding may allocate each item independently (the approach taken in [17] ), this is not possible in CPP. We must respect the cardinality constraint of k on the set of chosen items, and therefore our rounding scheme must by fiat be dependent. This presents a major challenge in analyzing our rounding scheme. Whereas the expected value of a submodular function on a product distribution (i.e. independent rounding) has been studied extensively, and is closely related to the now well-understood multi-linear (see e.g. [5, 30] ), analyzing the expected value of a dependent distribution -in particular proving it to be a concave function of underlying parameters -is a technical challenge that we overcome by combining techniques from combinatorics, convex analysis, and matroid theory.
Additional Related Work
Combinatorial Public Projects, in particular its exact variant, was first introduced by Papadimitriou, Schapira and Singer [27] . They show that no deterministic truthful mechanism for exact CPP with submodular valuations can guarantee better than a O( √ m) approximation to the optimal social welfare. The non-strategic version of the problem, on the other hand, is equivalent to maximizing a submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint, and admits a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm due to Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher [21] , and this is optimal [28] assuming P = NP .
Buchfuhrer, Schapira and Singer [4] explored approxima-tion algorithms and truthful mechanisms for CPP with various classes of valuations in the submodular hierarchy. The most relevant result of [4] to our paper is a lower-bound of O( √ m) on deterministic truthful mechanisms for the exact variant of CPP with coverage valuations -a class of valuations for which our randomized mechanism for flexible CPP obtains a (1 − 1/e) approximation.
Most recently, Dobzinski [7] showed two lower bounds for CPP in the value oracle model: A lower bound of O( √ m) on universally truthful mechanisms for flexible CPP with submodular valuations, and a lower bound of O( √ m) on truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact CPP with submodular valuations. We note that the latter was the first unconditional lower bound on truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
PRELIMINARIES

Combinatorial Public Projects
In i vi(S). We consider Combinatorial Public Projects where each player's valuation vi is know to lie in some set V of valuation functions. We abbreviate the set of instances of CPP constrained to valuations V as CPP(V). As first defined in [27] , CPP was considered with V equal to the set of monotone submodular functions. In this paper, we focus on CPP with matroid-rank-sum (MRS) valuations -a large subset of monotone submodular functions.
Mechanism Design Basics
We consider direct-revelation mechanisms for combinatorial public projects. Fix m,n, and k, and let S = {S ⊆ [m] : |S| ≤ k} denote the set of feasible solutions. A mechanism comprises an allocation rule, which is a function from (hopefully truthfully) reported valuation functions v1, . . . , vn : 2
[m] → R to a feasible outcome S ∈ S, and a payment rule, which is a function from reported valuation functions to a required payment from each player. We allow the allocation and payment rules to be randomized.
A mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is truthful in expectation if every player always maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully reporting its valuation function, meaning that
for every player i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation function v i , and (reported) valuation functions v−i of the other players. The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The mechanisms that we design can be thought of as randomized variations on the classical VCG mechanism, as we explain next. Recall that the VCG mechanism is defined by the (generally intractable) allocation rule that selects the welfare-maximizing outcome with respect to the reported valuation functions, and the payment rule that charges each player i a bid-independent "pivot term" minus the reported welfare earned by other players in the selected outcome. This (deterministic) mechanism is truthful; see e.g. [22] . Now let dist(S) denote the probability distributions over the feasible set S, and let D ⊆ dist(S) be a compact subset of them. The corresponding Maximal in Distribution Range (MIDR) allocation rule is defined as follows: given reported valuation functions v1, . . . , vn, return an outcome that is sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ D that maximizes the expected welfare ES∼D[ i vi(S)] over all distributions D ∈ D. Analogous to the VCG mechanism, there is a (randomized) payment rule that can be coupled with this allocation rule to yield a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see [8] ).
Matroid Rank Sum Valuations
We now define matroid rank sum valuations. Relevant concepts from matroid theory are reviewed in Appendix B.1. 
We do not assume any particular representation of MRS functions, and require only oracle access to their (expected) values on certain distributions (see Section 2.4).
MRS valuations include most concrete examples of monotone submodular functions that appear in the literaturethis includes coverage functions
3 , matroid weighted-rank functions 4 , and all convex combinations thereof. Moreover, as shown in [28] , 1 − 1/e is the best approximation possible for CPP with coverage valuations -and hence also for MRS valuations -in polynomial time, even ignoring strategic considerations.
Lotteries and Oracles
A value oracle for a valuation v : 2
[m] → R takes as input a set S ⊆ [m], and returns v(S). We define an analogous oracle that takes in a description of a simple lottery over sets S ⊆ [m], and outputs the expectation of v over this lottery. The lotteries we consider will be of a very simple form, which we describe next.
, and let x ∈ [0, 1] m be a vector such that j xj ≤ 1. We interpret x as a probability distribution over [m] ∪ { * }, where * represents not choosing a project. Specifically, project j ∈ [m] is chosen with probability xj, and * is chosen with probability 1 − j xj. We define a distribution D R k (x) over 2 [m] , and call this distribution the k-bounded lottery with marginals x and promise
Essentially, this lottery commits to choosing projects R, and adds an additional k projects chosen randomly with replacement from distribution x. When R = ∅, as will be the case through most of this paper, we omit mention of the promised set. We can now define a randomized analogue of a value oracle that returns the expected value of a bounded-lottery. 
In our model for CPP, we assume that a player with valuation function vi can answer bounded-lottery-value oracle queries for vi. A bounded-lottery-value oracle is a generalization of value oracles. Nevertheless, it is the case that a bounded-lottery-value oracle can be implemented using a value oracle for some succinctly represented examples of MRS valuations, such as explicit coverage functions (In similar fashion to [17, Appendix A] ).
More generally we note that bounded-lottery-value oracles can be approximated arbitrarily well, with high probability, using value oracles; this is done by random sampling, and we omit the technical details. Unfortunately, we are not able to reconcile the incurred sampling errors with the need for exactness characteristic of truthful mechanism design. However, we suspect that relaxing our solution concept to approximate truthfulness -also known as -truthfulnesswould remove this difficulty, and allow us to relax our oracle model to the more traditional value-oracles.
Convex Rounding
In this section, we review convex rounding, a framework for the design of truthful mechanisms introduced by Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [17] . We present the main definitions and lemmas as they pertain to combinatorial public projects. For a more thorough and general treatment of convex rounding, we refer the reader to [17, Section 3] .
We consider the standard integer programming formulation of CPP. There is a variable xj ∈ {0, 1} for each project j ∈ [m], and the goal is to set at most k of the variables to 1 so that the welfare v(x) = i vi({j : xj = 1}) is maximized. We relax this integer program in the obvious way to the polytope P = x ∈ R m : j xj ≤ k, x 0 . We postulate a rounding scheme r that maps points of P to the feasible solutions S = {S ⊆ [m] : |S| ≤ k} of CPP. We allow r to be randomized, so that r(x) is a distribution over S for each x ∈ P. Traditionally, approximation algorithms optimize an objective v(x) -often a simple extension of v to P -over the set P of fractional solutions, and then round the optimal fractional point x * to a solution r(x * ) in the original feasible set S. Many of the best approximation algorithms for various problems are based on this relax-solve-round framework. Unfortunately, however, this approach is almost always incompatible with the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the fact that the rounding step is often unpredictable. Truthful mechanism design, on the other hand, is intimately tied to exact optimization, as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority truthful mechanisms for multi-parameter problems are based on the VCG paradigm (see Section 2.2).
In an effort to reconcile the techniques of approximation algorithms and truthful mechanism design, Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan proposed optimizing directly on the output of the rounding scheme, rather than on its input. This defines an optimization problem induced by relaxation P and rounding scheme r. Stated for CPP with the relaxation as described above, the problem is as follows.
They consider a simple allocation rule, which we state for CPP in Algorithm 1, that solves (2) optimally. They observe that this allocation rule is maximal in distributional range. For α ≤ 1, we say that the rounding scheme r for CPP(V) is α-approximate if, whenever x is an integer point of P corresponding to a set S ∈ S, and vi ∈ V for each i, we have that
In other words, rounding does not degrade the quality of an integer solution by more than α. Given the definition of Algorithm 1, it is easy to conclude the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 ([17]). If r is an α-approximate rounding scheme for CPP(V), then Algorithm 1 is an α-approximation algorithm for CPP(V).
For reasons outlined in [17] , implementing Algorithm 1 efficiently is impossible for most rounding schemes r in the literature. To get around this difficulty, they advocate designing rounding schemes that render (2) a convex optimization problem.
Definition 2.5. Consider a randomized rounding scheme r : P → dist(S). We say r is a convex rounding scheme for CPP(V) if, whenever vi ∈ V for all i, the objective
Lemma 2.6. When r is a convex rounding scheme for CPP(V) , (2) is a convex optimization problem for each instance of CPP(V).
Under additional technical conditions, discussed in the context of combinatorial public projects in Appendix A, convex program (2) can be solved efficiently (e.g., using the ellipsoid method). This reduces the design of a polynomialtime α-approximate MIDR algorithm to designing a polynomial time α-approximate convex rounding scheme.
Summarizing, Lemmas 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 give the following informal theorem. 
THE MECHANISM
In this section, we prove the main result. We structure the proof of Theorem 3.1 as follows. We define the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme, which we denote by r k , in Section 3.1. We prove that r k is (1 − 1/e)-approximate (Lemma 3.2), and convex (Lemma 3.3). Lemmas 2.3, 2.4 and 3.2, taken together, imply that Algorithm 1 when instantiated with r = r k , is a (1 − 1/e)-approximate MIDR allocation rule. Lemma 3.3 reduces implementing this allocation rule to solving a convex program.
In Appendix A, we handle the technical and numerical issues related to solving convex programs. First, we prove that our instantiation of Algorithm 1 can be implemented in expected polynomial-time using the ellipsoid method under a simplifying assumption on the numerical conditioning of our convex program (Lemma A.2). Then we show in Section A.3 that the previous assumption can be removed by slightly modifying our algorithm.
Finally, we prove that truth-telling VCG payments can be computed efficiently in Lemma B.4. Taken together, these lemmas complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The k-Bounded-Lottery Rounding Scheme
We devise a rounding scheme r k that we term the kbounded-lottery rounding scheme. Given a feasible solution x to linear program (2), we let distribution r k (x) be the k-bounded-lottery with marginals x/k (and promise ∅), as defined in Section 2.4. We make this more explicit in Algorithm 2. The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme is (1 − 1/e) approximate and convex. We prove the approximation lemma below. As for convexity, we present a simplified proof for the special case of coverage valuations in Section 3.2, and present the proof for MRS valuations in Section 3.3. Proof. Fix n, m, k and {vi} n i=1 . Let S ⊆ [m] be a feasible solution to CPP -i.e. |S| ≤ k. Let 1S be the vector with 1 in indices corresponding to S, and 0 otherwise. Let T ∼ r k (1S). We will first show that each element of j ∈ S is included in T with probability at least 1−1/e. Observe that T is the union of k independent draws from a distribution on [m] ∪ { * }, where each time the probability of j ∈ S is 1/k. Therefore, the probability that j is included in T is 1 
Algorithm 2 The k-Bounded-Lottery
− (1 − 1/k) k ≥ 1 − 1/e.
Submodularity now implies that E[vi(T )] ≥ (1 − 1/e) · vi(S) for each player i -this was proved in many contexts
Warm-up: Convexity for Coverage Valuations
In this section, we prove a special case of Lemma 3. [m] → R is a coverage function. We let v(S) = i vi(S) be the welfare of a solution S to CPP. It is an easy observation that the sum of coverage functions is also a coverage function. Therefore v(S) is a coverage function. We let Y be a set, and A1, . . . , Am ⊆ Y, such that v(S) = | ∪j∈S Aj|. While our proof extends easily to the case where Y is an arbitrary measure space, we assume in this section that Y is a finite set for simplicity.
Let P denote the polytope of fractional solutions to CPP as given in (2) . We now show that E S∼r k (x) [v(S)] is a concave function of x for x ∈ P, completing the proof of Lemma 3.3 for the special case of coverage valuations. Take an arbitrary x ∈ P, and let S ∼ r k (x) be a random variable. Using linearity of expectations, we can rewrite the expected welfare as follows. . We can rewrite the probability of covering as follows.
E[v(S)] = E[| ∪j∈S
The final form is simply the composition of the concave function g(y) = 1 − (1 − y/k) k with the affine function y → j∈T xj. It is well known that composing a concave function with an affine function yields another concave function (see e.g. [2] ). This completes the proof.
Convexity for MRS Valuations
In this section, we will prove Lemma 3.3 in its full generality. First, we recall the discrete hessian matrix, as defined in [17] . 
It was shown in [17] that the discrete hessian matrices are negative semi-definite for matroid rank sum functions. [m] → R, the following function of x ∈ P k is concave in x.
We use techniques from combinatorics to write Pr[r k (x) = S] in a form that will be easier to work with. For T ⊆ [m], we use xT as short-hand for j∈T xj, and T as short-hand
Proof. It is easy to see that Pr[r k (x) = S] is equal to:
Using the inclusion-exclusion principle, we can rewrite (6) as follows:
Letting R = S \ T in (7), we get
We can easily simplify (8) to conclude that
Next, we observe that the expression Pr[r k (x) ⊆ R] can be expressed as a simple closed form in x. Let p1, . . . , p k and I1, . . . , Im be as in Algorithm 2. The event r k (x) ⊆ R occurs exactly when none of p1, . . . , p k land in the intervals corresponding to projects R. Recalling that the interval Ij of project j has length xj/k, we get that the probability of any particular pt falling in ∪ j∈R Ij is exactly x R /k. Therefore, by the independence of the variables p1, . . . , p k , we get that
Combining (9) and (10) completes the proof.
Building on Claim 3.6, we now express the Hessian matrix of G v k as a non-negative weighted sum of discrete Hessian matrices of v. We note that when x ∈ P k , it is easy to verify that k−2 k · x ∈ P k−2 , and therefore (11) is well defined.
, possibly with i = j. We work with G v k as defined in Equation (4), and plug in expression (5) .
Differentiating with respect to xi and xj gives:
We group the terms by projecting S onto [m] \ {i, j}, and then we simplify the resulting expression.
The second equality follows from the fact that · x, and plugging the resulting expression into into (12), we conclude that
Claims (3.5) and (3.7) establish that, when v is MRS and
is a non-negative weighted sum of negative semi-definite matrices for each x ∈ P k . A non-negative weighted sum of negative semi-definite matrices is negative semi-definite. Therefore, the Hessian matrix of G v k is negative semi-definite at each x ∈ P k , and we conclude that G v k is a concave function on P k . This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3.
APPENDIX
A. SOLVING THE CONVEX PROGRAM
In this section, we overcome some technical difficulties related to the solvability of convex programs. We follow the general outline of [17, Appendix B] , modifying the proofs throughout in order to handle the additional technical difficulties specific to CPP. We show in Section A.1 that, in the bounded-lottery-value oracle model, the four conditions for "solvability" of convex programs, as stated in Fact B.3, are easily satisfied for convex program (2) when r = r k . However, an additional challenge remains: "solving" a convex program -as in Definition B.2 -returns an approximately optimal solution. Indeed the optimal solution of a convex program may be irrational in general, so this is unavoidable.
We show how to overcome this difficulty if we settle for polynomial runtime in expectation. While the optimal solution x * of (2) cannot be computed explicitly, the random variable r k (x * ) can be sampled in expected polynomial-time. The key idea is the following: sampling the random variable r k (x * ) rarely requires precise knowledge of x * . Depending on the coin flips of r k , we decide how accurately we need to solve convex program (2) in order compute r k (x * ). Roughly speaking, we show that the probability of requiring a (1− )-approximation falls exponentially in 1 . As a result, we can sample r k (x * ) in expected polynomial-time. We implement this plan in Section A.2 under the simplifying assumption that convex program (2) is well-conditioned -i.e. is "sufficiently concave" everywhere. In Section A.3, we show how to remove that assumption by slightly modifying our algorithm. It suffices to show that the four conditions of Fact B.3 are satisfied in our setting. The first three are immediate from elementary combinatorial optimization (see for example [29] ). It remains to show that the first-order oracle, as defined in Fact B.3, can be implemented in polynomial-time in the bounded-lottery-value oracle model. We let f (x) denote the objective function of convex program (2) when r = r k . This objective can, by definition, be written as follows.
A.1 Approximating the Convex Program
where vi is the valuation function of player i and
is the outcome of querying the bounded-lottery-value oracle of vi with bound k and marginals x/k. Therefore, we can evaluate f (x) using n bounded-lottery-value queries, one for each player. It remains to show that we can also evaluate the (multi-variate) derivative f (x) of f (x). Using definition (4) and Claim 3.6, we take the partial derivative of G v i k with respect to xj and simplify the resulting expression.
The second equality follows by grouping the terms of the summation by the projection of S onto [m] \ {j}. The third equality follows from the observation that v(S∪{j})−v(S) = 0 when S includes j. The fourth equality follows by a simple re-arrangement and application of Claim 3.6.
Inspect the final form (13) 
A.2 The Well-Conditioned Case
In this section, we make the following simplifying assumption: The objective function f (x) of convex program (2) with r = r k , when restricted to any line in the feasible set P, has a second derivative of magnitude at least λ =
everywhere, where the polynomial in the denominator may be arbitrary. This is equivalent to requiring that every eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix of f (x) has magnitude at least λ when evaluated at any point in P. Under this assumption, we prove Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2. Assume the magnitude of the second deriva-
everywhere. Algorithm 1, instantiated with r = r k , can be simulated in time polynomial in n and m in expectation.
Let x
* be the optimal solution to convex program (2) with r = r k . Algorithm 1 outputs a set of projects distributed as r k (x * ). The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme, as described in Algorithm 2, requires making k independent decisions: for ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we draw p uniformly from [0, 1] and decide which interval Ij, if any, p falls into. In other words, we find the minimum index j (if any) such that j≤j x * j /k ≥ p . Fix . For most realizations of p , we can calculate j using only coarse estimates xj to x * j . Assume we have an estimation oracle for x * that, on input δ, returns a δ-estimate x of x * : Specifically, xj − x * j ≤ δ for each j ∈ [m]. If p falls outside the "uncertainty zones" of x, such as when |p − j ≤j x j /k| > δm/k for each j ∈ [m], it is easy to see that we can correctly determine j by using x in lieu of x. The total measure of the uncertainty zones of x is at most 2m 2 δ, therefore p lands outside the uncertainty zones with probability at least 1 − 2m 2 δ. The following claim shows that if the estimation oracle for x * can be implemented in time polynomial in log(1/δ), then we can simulate the k-bounded-lottery rounding procedure in expected polynomial-time. Let S = ∅ 6:
Choose project j * ∈ [m] uniformly at random. 9:
Let S = {j * } 10:
end if
11: end if
We can write the expected welfare E S∼r Using linearity of expectations and the fact that β is independent of the choice of j * to simplify the expression, we get that E S∼r 
It is clear that the expected welfare when using r = r + k is within 1 − μ = 1 − 2 −2nm of the expected welfare when using r = r k in the instantiation of Algorithm 1. Using Lemma 3.2, we conclude that r + k is a (1 − 1/e − 2 −2nm )-approximate rounding scheme. Moreover, using Lemma 3.3, as well as the fact that 1 − (1 − xj/k) k is a concave function, we conclude that r + k is a convex rounding scheme. Therefore, this establishes the analogues of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 for r everywhere. Since the curvature of concave functions is always non-positive, and moreover the curvature of the sum of two functions is the sum of their curvatures, it suffices to show that the second term of the sum (15) 
B. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARIES B.1 Matroid Theory
In this section, we review some basics of matroid theory. For a more comprehensive reference, see [26] .
A matroid M is a pair (X , I), where X is a finite ground set, and I is a non-empty family of subsets of X -often referred to as the independent sets of the matroid -satisfying the following two properties. 
